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Abstract. Fiscal transparency has been consistently identified as a key feature of efficient 
fiscal policy and a prerequisite for good public governance. However, measuring fiscal 
transparency remains an empirical challenge, and extant literature on developing countries 
is still sparse. To that end, this paper examines the determinants of fiscal transparency in 
developing countries. We add to the existing literature by proposing a new replicable index 
of fiscal transparency that is consistent with the definition provided by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Additional determinants of fiscal transparency, 
which are exclusively relevant in the study of developing countries, are also examined. In 
particular, we introduce such factors as natural resources, the openness of the economy, the 
literacy rate of the population, and the quality of institutions. Because of possible 
endogeneity arising from interdependence among some variables, two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) is used to ensure that the estimators are consistent. As a robustness check, the same 
estimation procedure was replicated by replacing our index of fiscal transparency with 
respectively the index of Andreula et al. (2009) and the Open Budget Index, both of which 
use a significant similar number of developing countries of our selected sample. The results 
provide additional credence to our suggested procedure. The paper found that the level of 
natural resources and the openness of the capital account negatively affect fiscal 
transparency. However, the quality of institutions and literacy were found to positively 
affect fiscal transparency. The findings of this paper provide an explanation of why, after a 
decade of fiscal transparency programs, many developing countries are still lagging behind, 
thereby losing the potential benefits mentioned in the literature. These findings could help 
guide policies directed at improving fiscal transparency in the case of developing countries. 
Keywords. Fiscal Transparency, Development, Natural Resources, Institutions Quality, and 
Economic Openness. 
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1. Introduction 
he relevance of fiscal transparency as a feature of efficient fiscal policy is 
central to the current debate about improving public governance and its 
consequences. Most of the arguments center on the possible advantages of 
fiscal transparency in terms of fiscal discipline, reduction of deficits and 
management of public debt, or budgetary credibility. With the support of several 
international organizations, a growing body of literature has emerged; much of it 
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being concerned with the measurement and determinants of fiscal transparency.i 
Several definitions have been proposed to explain the concept of fiscal 
transparency. The most cited definition is that of Kopits and Craig (1998) who 
consider fiscal transparency as: “openness toward the public at large about 
government structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector 
accounts, and projections. It involves ready access to reliable, comprehensive, 
timely, understandable, and internationally comparable information on 
government activities so that the electorate and financial markets can accurately 
assess the government’s financial position and the true costs and benefits of 
government activities, including their present and future economic and social 
implications.” In other words, fiscal transparency can be summarized as the 
systematic and timely release of all relevant fiscal information (Benito & Bastida 
2009). The above definition splits the world into two groups of countries: 
developed countries which have strong enough institutions to achieve high 
transparency of the budget, on the one hand, and developing countries which still 
face fiscal opacity, on the other hand. Therefore, an analysis of this issue might 
require taking into account such differences. Yet, recent analyses have studied 
heterogeneous samples of countries, taking together developed, emergent and 
developing countries. This has led to results that are too general to be associated 
with a specific group, such as developing countries.  
This paper then aims at identifying some critical determinants of fiscal 
transparency typical for developing countries. We want to verify whether some 
institutional and socio-economical indicators—namely, natural resources wealth, 
degree of trade openness, low literacy and quality of the institutions—are 
associated with the level of fiscal transparency in developing countries. The 
objective of this study is at least twofold. First, to provide an idea of why, after a 
decade of fiscal transparency programs, many developing countries are still lagging 
behind, thereby losing the potential benefits mentioned in the literature. Second, to 
identify and analyse factors, which may enable the improvement of fiscal 
transparency in the case of developing countries.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section two is a short review of relevant 
literature. Section three presents a direct and replicable index measuring fiscal 
transparency practice, constructed for this analysis. In Section four, that index is 
used empirically to examine the determinants of fiscal transparency. Section five 
discusses the results and Section six summarises the conclusions.  
 
1. Measurement and Determinants of Fiscal 
Transparency 
In general, several variables have been found to determine good public 
governance. Rose-Ackerman (2005), Lederman et al. (2005), and Damania et al. 
(2004) have considered economic and political freedom, globalization and level of 
development, as significant factors of good public governance.  
While several researchers, such as Andreula et al. (2009) present fiscal 
transparency as a prerequisite for good governance, the literature on its 
determinants is still very limited. Moreover, some institutional and socio-economic 
variables are more likely seen as determinants, rather than parameters, of fiscal 
transparency. 
Alt et al. (2006) investigates, conceptually and empirically, the determinants of 
fiscal transparency based on data from the United States. They explore two broad 
sets of explanatory factors under which politicians might implement more 
transparent budgetary procedures: the political setting and the fiscal environment. 
They found that both political and fiscal outcomes affect the level of transparency; 
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that political competition tends to increase the level of fiscal transparency, and that 
fiscal imbalance, in the form of higher surpluses or deficits, also contributes to 
higher transparency. Andreula et al. (2009) extends their analysis to the relation 
between institutional factors and fiscal transparency. They concluded that higher 
levels of institutional quality give way to better indicators of fiscal transparency. 
Ellisand Fender (2006) also find fiscal transparency to be associated, implicitly or 
explicitly, with the existence of levels of corruption and vice versa.  
Ross (2011) studied the correlation between mineral wealth and fiscal 
transparency, based on a sample of 83 countries. He found that the link between 
natural wealth and fiscal transparency depends on the existing political system. 
Among democracies, a country’s mineral wealth is not related to the transparency 
of its government. But among autocracies, greater oil wealth is correlated with less 
fiscal transparency, while greater non-fuel mineral wealth is paradoxically 
associated with greater transparency. 
 In general, according to the broad definition given above, Bernardino and 
Bastida (2009) noticed that fiscal transparency goes along with two important 
factors: an effective legislation that scrutinizes budget reports, discusses and 
influences budget policy; and an effective civil society, represented through the 
media and nongovernmental organizations, which influences budget policy and 
hold government accountable. Also, the IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal 
Transparency makes recommendations indicated to achieve a greater level of fiscal 
transparency. The organizational framework for the Code is based on four general 
principles that aim to capture the essential elements of fiscal transparency: clarity 
of roles and responsibilities; public availability of information; openness of the 
budget preparation, execution and reporting; and independent assurances of 
Integrity.  
The most important challenge of the literature on fiscal transparency remains its 
measurement. The economic literature on fiscal transparency is of recent origin, 
but the existing measures are already quite divers (De Simone, 2009). Most of 
these measures are constructed using non-numerical reports. For example Hameed 
(2005), Jarmuzeket al (2009) and Andreula et al. (2009) use the Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) which are consistent with IMF and 
the World Bank definition, such as stated in the Code Of Good Practice of fiscal 
transparency. They assigned numerical values to the performance of the countries 
selected according specific aspects of the reports. Following the same definition, 
Glennerster and Shin (2003) proposed a simpler index. Their index measures the 
simple adherence to principles of fiscal transparency by using dummy variable to 
evaluate whether or not a country has published an Article IV report or a ROSC, or 
whether it has complied with the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS).  
Other indices of fiscal transparency proposed in the literature are constructed 
using different source documents. Gelosand Wei (2005) considered the yearly 
Global Competitiveness Report for various years produced by the World 
Economie, while Alt and Lassen (2003), Andersen andNielsen (2010) used the 
self-reported OECD’s Best Practices for Budget Transparency data. Also the 
International Budget Partnership (IBP) provides the biannual Open Budget Index 
(OBI). This uses a surveyconducted by intermediate organisations or pressure 
groups of sample countries which focuses on whether the government provides the 
public with timely access to comprehensive information contained in eight key 
budget documents.  
In addition to the differences in the definition of fiscal transparency, some 
indices are limited geographically. Guerrero and Hofbauer (2001) propose an index 
of budget transparency for five Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, and Peru. The index measures the degree of accessibility and utility of 
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information issued by national governments with respect to finances, revenues and 
expenditures. 
The index proposed by Bernardino and Bastida (2009) matches the World Bank 
Budgeting Database with the “OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency”. 
Bernoth and Wolff (2008) follow that approach and propose two measures of fiscal 
transparency: one is an index of auditing, calculated using the answers collected by 
an OECD and World Bank survey in 2003; the second index is based on the 
indicator developed by von Hagen (1992), Hallerberg et al. (2001) and Hallerberg 
et al. (2005). The latter measures three things: (a) the assessments of transparency 
carried out by government officials; (b) the degree to which special funds are 
included in the budget draft; (c) information on whether the budget is a unique 
document, whether the budget is linked to national accounts, and whether 
government loans are included.  
 
2. Construction of the Fiscal Transparency Index 
This section first introduces four modules which are retained by way of 
organising information from the ROSC. The definition of the modules matches the 
codes of the 2001 and 2007 manuals. The modules enable the construction of a 
fiscal transparency index. This index is then compared with other indices which 
already exist in the literature. 
2.1. The Modules 
Following Hameed (2005), Jarmuzek et al. (2009), and Andreula et al. (2009) 
four modules are considered: (a) “Budget Structure” (BST) evaluates the 
presentation and structure of the budget; (b) “Budget Objectivity” (BO) captures 
the realism of the budget’s objectives; (c) “Budget Process” (BP) evaluates the 
control of the execution of the budget; (d) “Extra Budgetary Activity” (EBA) 
assesses the weakness of the budget in terms of the government transactions that 
are not included in the budget documents. These four modules are independently 
constituted of four or five practices, each of which corresponds to one or two codes 
in the 2001 IMF Manual of Fiscal transparency. These modules are then updated 
by matching the selected codes with corresponding codes in the 2007 Manual. This 
has the following implications. 
First, several codes included in the 2001 Manual ended up having more than 
one correspondent code in the Manual of 2007. The wordings of the codes in the 
Manual of 2007 are sometimes different from those of the Manual of 2001, due to 
the fact that the 2007 Manual is more exhaustive and therefore contains more 
codes. For example, the practice first named “Projections guided by a Medium-
term Economic Framework” corresponds to code 3.1.3 in the 2001 Manual that 
says: “The annual budget should be prepared and presented within a 
comprehensive and consistent quantitative macroeconomic framework, and the 
main assumptions underlying the budget should be provided”.The corresponding 
code in the 2007 Manual is code 2.1.2. The latter adds a fiscal aspect to the 
economic framework as follows: “The annual budget should be realistic, and 
should be prepared and presented within a comprehensive medium-term 
macroeconomic and fiscal policy framework. Fiscal targets and any fiscal rules 
should be clearly stated and explained”. In view of this statement, code 4.1.1 of the 
2007 Manual becomes a relevant part of the same practice, since it states: “Budget 
forecasts and updates should reflect recent revenue and expenditure trends, 
underlying macroeconomic developments, and well-defined policy commitments.” 
Thus that practice is labelled, “Projections guided by a Medium-Term Economic 
and Fiscal Framework”. 
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Second, some codes in the 2001 Manual do not have an exact correspondent in 
the 2007 manual. This is true in the case of the code 3.1.4 in the 2001 Manual, 
which states: “New policies being introduced in the annual budget should be 
clearly described”.No code in the 2007 Manual comes close to the meaning of this 
statement.Therefore, no practice on these codes was defined in any module.  
Third, some codes are quite close in meaning, in moving from the 2001 Manual 
to the 2007 Manual. This is the case for the practices that correspond to codes 4.2.1 
and 3.3.3 of Manual of 2001. For code 4.2.1 the corresponding in Manual 2007 is 
4.3.1, which says: “Public finances and policies should be subject to scrutiny by a 
national audit body or an equivalent organization that is independent of the 
executive”, and corresponding to code 3.3.3 is code 4.2.5, which states: 
“Government activities and finances should be internally audited, and audit 
procedures should be open to review”. Thus, both codes have been merged into a 
single practice named” National Independent Audit”.  
 
Table 1: Fiscal Transparency Modules 
Modules Practices of fiscal transparency Code (2001) Code (2007) 
Budget 
Structure  
Budget classification  
Release of data 
Budget coverage 
Independent Assessment of Forecast 
Budget realism 
3.2.1 
2.2.1, 2.2.2 
2.1.1, 3.2.1 
4.2.2 
4.1.1 
3.2.2, 3.2.1 
3.3.2, 3.3.1 
3.1.1 
4.3.3 
4.1.1 
Budget 
Objectivity  
Policy objectives and sustainability  
Forward Estimates 
Projections guided by a Medium-term 
Economic and Fiscal Framework 
Fiscal/Macro risk 
3.1.1 
2.1.2 
3.1.3 
 
3.1.5 
2.1.4,2.1.2,3.1.7 
3.1.2 
2.1.2, 4.1.1 
 
3.1.3 
Budget 
Process  
Accounting system  
National independent audit  
Final account  
Mid-year reporting 
3.3.1 
4.2.1; 3.3.3 
3.4.2 
3.4.1 
4.1.2, 2.2.1 
4.2.5, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.4 
2.2.4 
2.2.2 
Extra- 
Budgetary 
Activities 
Contingent liabilities  
Debt  
Quasi-fiscal activity – Financial  
Quasi-fiscal activity – NFPE 
Tax expenditures  
2.1.3 
2.1.4 
2.1.3, 1.1.4 
2.1.3, 1.1.4 
2.1.3 
3.1.3 
3.1.5, 3.2.3 
3.1.3, 1.1.4 
3.1.3, 3.1.6, 1.1.4 
3.1.3 
 
Table 1 presents the final classification.The first column presents the four 
modules, the second column includes the practices finally retained, the third 
column gives the codes in the 2001 IMF Manual, while the last column presents 
the corresponding codes in the 2007 IMF Manual. 
In order to derive an index that is more objective than the earlier ones and 
consistent with the current study, this paper defines three criteria as follows: firstly, 
every ROSC considered should be that of a developing countryii; secondly, every 
ROSC should have been published in 2004 or after for the reasons previously 
mentioned. On the basis of these first two criteria, only 27 developing countries’ 
fiscal transparency policies were rated. Thirdly, all ROSCs published between 
2004 and 2007 should be examined based on the 2001 Manual (Column 3), while 
those published after 2007 should be examined based on the 2007 Manual (Column 
4).  
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2.2.  Fiscal Transparency Index 
For each of the practices contained in Table 1, a value 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗  is assigned. 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 assumes 
the values 0; 0.33; 0.66 or 1, with 0 being assigned when the practice is not 
observed at all and 1 when it is completely observed (like in Hameed (2005)). 0.33 
and 0.66 are respectively the lower and the upper intermediate values. Such a range 
reduces subjectivity in evaluating the practices, and makes comparison of countries 
easier. A very short range of numbers like the dummy variables used by 
Glennerster and Shin (2003) excludes de facto the intermediate stages in the 
implementation of transparency standards-while the use of a very long range of 
numbers increases the subjectivity of the index. In fact, the ROSCs are reports 
written by different IMF officers, on different countries and at different times. 
Thus, some terms and expressions are likely to have similar meanings. For 
example, Andreula et al. (2009) used a range of 10 numbers.  They assigned 
different numbers to some practices like “adherence limited”, “Code partly 
followed” or “Code mostly followed”, which do not seem to be essentially 
different. 
The calculation of the fiscal transparency index follows two steps: the 
calculation of the modules indices, and the calculation of the comprehensive index. 
For the calculation of the sub-indices we consider the sample average of the 
available evaluated practices. In symbols the sample average of the evaluated 
practices is  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗=1   𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,3,4   (1) 
with 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵,𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃,𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸 —respectively Budget Structure, Budget 
Objectivity, Budget Process, Extra- Budgetary Activities—corresponds to the 
modules as defined in Table1, while 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗  refers to fiscal transparency practice j. 
is the number of fiscal transparency practices 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 that are rated in the ROSC of a 
country corresponding to a specific module I, with i =1,2,3or 4 corresponding to 
the four modules defined in Table 1.  For example,  means that four 
practices were rated in module i. This may be less than the maximum number of 
practices to be rated in that module, due to missing information. 
 
Table 2: Indices of Fiscal Transparency 
Country RoscYear BS BO BP EBA FT 
Kenya  2008 0.66 0.83 0.50 0.80 0.70 
Thailand 2009 0.93 0.41 0.58 0.60 0.65 
Ukraine 2004 0.86 0.66 0.58 0.46 0.64 
Indonesia 2010 0.73 0.58 0.75 0.53 0.64 
Moldova  2004 0.83 0.83 0.58 0.33 0.63 
Gabon  2006 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.60 0.56 
Macedonia 2006 0.73 0.50 0.83 0.13 0.53 
Morocco 2005 0.53 0.50 0.75 0.40 0.53 
Namibia 2008 0.40 0.83 0.66 0.33 0.53 
Bulgaria 2005 0.53 0.58 0.58 0.33 0.50 
Guatemala  2006 0.75 0.33 0.50 0.33 0.47 
Algeria 2005 0.50 0.50 0.41 0.46 0.47 
Timor Leste 2010 0.80 0.25 0.75 0.07 0.46 
Barbados  2007 0.53 0.42 0.66 0.26 0.46 
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Croatia 2004 0.73 0.33 0.66 0.13 0.46 
Ghana 2004 0.33 0.83 0.58 0.13 0.45 
Costa Rica  2007 0.60 0.42 0.58 0.20 0.44 
serbia 2009 0.66 0.66 0.17 0.26 0.44 
Lebanon 2005 0.50 0.17 0.58 0.46 0.43 
Paraguay  2006 0.60 0.08 0.75 0.20 0.41 
Tajikistan 2007 0.40 0.66 0.50 0.13 0.40 
Kyrgyz 2008 0.60 0.33 0.41 0.13 0.37 
EqGuinea 2005 0.41 0.42 0.22 0.33 0.35 
El Salvador  2011 0.60 0.17 0.50 0.08 0.35 
Mozambique 2008 0.53 0.33 0.33 0.07 0.31 
Cameroon 2010 0.53 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.29 
Jordan  2006 0.33 0.17 0.25 0.26 0.26 
 
There are at least two advantages of using the simple average in this case. First, 
it leads to an index that is not affected by the lack of information in the ROSC of 
countries. One option would be to keep N constant over the countries of the 
sample. But that option makes sense if the ROSC specifies that missing 
information is the responsibility of the country. In such cases we assign 0 to the 
corresponding practice. Otherwise the country’s index would be unfairly reduced. 
Second, it assigns no weight to any particular practice. In other words, all the 
practices are equally weighted. The reason is that the Manuals do not assign 
different scores to the Codes, each of them being equally important for the 
implementation of the fiscal transparency program.  
The final index, FT, is the simple average of all the available practices 
evaluated as in equation 2. 
 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 1
𝑁𝑁
∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗
𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1  ; 𝑁𝑁 = ∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (2) 
 
This index displays continuous variables contained in the interval 0 to 1. For the 
rest of this paper, FT will refer to this fiscal transparency index. Note that N is the 
number of practices rated. It is different among some countries of the sample, once 
again due to missing information.  
Table 2 presents the FT and its sub-indices for the group of 27 developing 
countries and shows wide variations among countries. Kenya, Thailand and 
Ukraine have the highest level of fiscal transparency, while Jordan, Cameroon and 
Mozambique are the least transparent countries according to this index.  
2.3. Correlation Among the Indices 
This section first presents the correlation among the sub-indices; the objective is 
to see how they are interrelated. Next, it presents a summary of each sub-index in 
order to see the most observed fiscal transparency practices in the sample of 
countries.  
 
Table 3: Correlation among Fiscal Transparency Indices 
Indices FT BS BO BP EBA 
BS 0.5904 1    
BO 0.6327 0.0135 1   
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BP 0.5424 0.3381 0.0918 1  
EBA 0.7236 0.2166 0.3811 0.0892 1 
FT corresponds to the comprehensive index as presented in the text. BS, BO, BP and 
EBA are its sub-indices. The correlation is obtained on the indices defined for 27 countries 
based on their ROCS available on www.imf.org. The values in bold represent the 
correlation with the Comprehensive index, FT 
As depicted in Table 3, each of the sub-indices has a strong positive correlation 
with the final comprehensive fiscal transparency index (FT). EBA has the strongest 
correlation with FT. This is possibly because EBA gives less weight to information 
about government fiscal activity. Also table 3 reveals that the sub-indices are not 
highly correlated to one another. This means that each subset of practices is 
actually different from the others. One reason is the improvement in the structure 
and the presentation of the ROSCs, which occurred since 2004, in response to 
comments made about earlier ROSCs as reported in Petrie (2003). All this makes 
the assessment of fiscal transparency practices easier.  
 
Table 4:Summary Statistics of Fiscal Transparency Indices 
Module  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BS 27 0.6 0.16 0.33 0.93 
BO 27 0.47 0.22 0.08 0.83 
BP 27 0.54 0.18 0.17 0.83 
EBA 27 0.3 0.19 0.07 0.8 
FT 27 0.47 0.21 0.26 0.7 
 
This table presents a descriptive statistics of the indices that we constructed including 
the maximum and the minimum value, as well as the mean and the standard deviation for 
all the 27 countries of the sample. 
Overall it is clear from Table 4 that, the level of fiscal transparency in this 
sample does not seem to be as low as described in the literature, even though some 
countries display very low sub-indices. Indeed, several recent studies found very 
low levels of fiscal transparency for most of developing countries (Hameed, 2005; 
Jarmuzek et al., 2009; Benito and Bastida, 2009). However, Table 4 shows that the 
module of Budget Structure (BS) represents the set of most observed practices of 
fiscal transparency, while the least implemented practices are regrouped in the 
module of Extra Budgetary Activities (EBA). This result is intuitive in the sense 
that it shows that in developing countries, the presentation of fiscal documents is 
respectful of international standards, while the actual contents of the documents fall 
short of expectations.  
2.4. Comparison with Other Indices 
We believe that the constructed Fiscal Transparency Index is more objective, 
compared to other indices proposed in the literature for the following reasons: 
First, this paper follows the main principle of fiscal transparency as defined by the 
IMF, following Hameed (2005) or Jarmuzek et al. (2009). The main framework of 
fiscal transparency that developing countries follow is the one defined by the IMF 
and the World Bank, possibly because of their membership or because these 
institutions are their main funding agencies. Based on that, our approach evaluates 
the practice of fiscal transparency rather than sole adherence to principles. It uses 
the ROSCs, which are reports written by independent IMF officers on the level of 
observance of the IMF recommendations. These ROSCs follow the structure of the 
IMF Manuals and contain information that varies from one country to another. In 
contrast, for example, the OECD’s Best Practices for Budget Transparencydata are 
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self-reported data, where some countries are likely to have rated themselves too 
highly. 
Second, the index FT is very comprehensive. It combines the methodologies 
used by Hameed (2005), Jarmuzek et al. (2009) and Andrula et al. (2009). In 
addition to the practices retained by these authors, we added new ones. This is 
unusual, as the approaches to constructing fiscal transparency indices used by 
authors in the literature are often different from each other, leading to very diverse 
indices. 
Third, the present index is constructed using both the 2001 and 2007 IMF 
Manuals of Fiscal Transparency. Even though the original definition of fiscal 
transparency provided by Kopits and Craig (1998) continues to form the basis of 
the 2007 Manual, the order in which the pillars of the codes are presented, the 
reorganization, and the additional codes introduced improve the clarity and the 
coherence of the overall Manual. 
Fourth, this paper considers only the ROSCs published in 2004 or after. From 
2004 on, the IMF officers improved the structure of the ROSCs in the sense that 
each observation given is associated with its corresponding (code) as stated in the 
IMF Manual (2001 or 2007). iii  This makes the rating of the practices more 
objective compared to the ratings that were based on the ROSC before 2004. As 
Petrie (2003 p.6) argued, the ROSCs published before 2004 were written in a very 
compact way; the comments were provided without any mention of the practices 
they were referring to. Any evaluation based on that was very subjective, as the 
information about a practice is not easy to find. Also, the use of new ROSCs has 
the advantage of giving the information about the current practice of fiscal 
transparency that is still true. Therefore it reduces the gap that could exist between 
the information given by the index and the current real level of countries in terms 
of fiscal transparency. 
In addition to the above points, the present study’s sample of countries is 
sufficiently homogeneous in terms of the level of development, since only 
developing countries are considered. In other studies like Hameed (2005), Alt and 
Lassen (2006), Andreula et al. (2009), the samples of countries are more 
heterogeneous, composed of highly developed, emergent, and developing 
countries. Even though fiscal transparency is about application of common 
international standards, the present study intuitively believes that compliance with 
these standards might depend on the level of development of the country. 
 
Table 5: Spearman Rank Correlation between our Index and other Indices 
*We consider the average of the existing indices. The upper numbers represent the 
Spearman's rho (correlation coefficient). It corresponds to a monotonic trend between 
 
Indices Hameed (2005)1 OBI* Andrula et al. (2009) 
FT 0.7588 
(0.0007) 
0.4164 
(0.0429) 
0.6406 
(0.0007) 
BS 0.6558 
(0.0058) 
0.1481 
(0.4898) 
0.4973 
(0.0134) 
BO 0.5404 
(0.0307) 
0.2681 
(0.2053) 
0.5497 
(0.0054) 
BP 0.583 
(0.0178) 
0.4469 
(0.0286) 
0.5338 
(0.0072) 
EBA 0.1411 
(0.6023) 
0.1543 
(0.4716) 
0.163 
(0.4466) 
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ranked variables. The values in bracket represent the P-values (Prob> |t|).  It indicates the 
significance of the coefficient. If the P-value is smaller than 10%, 5% or 1%, the correlation 
(given by the level of the coefficient) is weak, medium or high, respectively.  Any P-value 
greater than 10% indicates that there is a non-significant monotonic correlation present 
between both variables. 
 
Table 5 proposes a comparison with the indices constructed by Hameed (2005), 
Andreula et al. (2009) and IBP’s Open Budget Index (OBI) only. We could not 
extend the comparison to other indices, because the number of countries our index 
has in common with these indices is too small. In order to eliminate the effect of 
differences in terms of methodologies and ranges of numbers used, we apply the 
Spearman (1904) rank correlation test, which considers the rankings of the 
countries rather than the values assigned by each index. Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient is a statistical measure of the strength of a monotonic relationship 
between paired data. 
It appears that there is a strong, positive monotonic correlation between our 
fiscal transparency index and the indices respectively constructed by Hameed 
(2005), Andreula et al. (2009) and the IBP (OBI). So our index is consistent with 
earlier indices constructed in this field. iv 
 
3. Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Fiscal 
Transparency 
The empirical analysis of this paper consists of two steps: first the choice of the 
potential determinants, and second the specification of a model according to that 
choice and its estimation. 
3.1. Choice of Variables 
Following the literature on the issue of public governance, four main aspects of 
the economy are considered here that potentially affect the level of fiscal 
transparency of a country: the natural wealth of the country, the quality of the 
institutions, the literacy level of the population, and the openness to trade and to 
international capital movements. More discussion on the choice of the variables is 
given below, as well as the sources and definitions of the data. For each of the 
selected variable, we consider the average of the values over three years, following 
most of the authors such as Hameed (2005): the two years before and the year of 
the publication of the ROSC. The objective is to obtain a “semi-causal” correlation 
test between each of the selected variables and the fiscal transparency index. The 
following paragraphs propose the discussion about the choice of the variables. In 
order to check the potential direction of the correlation between each of these 
variables and fiscal transparency, we propose graphs, which present monotonic 
trends between each of the selected variables and fiscal transparency (all ranked) 
for the 27 selected developing countries. 
3.1.1. Natural Wealth and Fiscal Transparency  
Carbonnier(2007) shows that natural resources revenues tend to widen the 
budget deficit, in the sense that they lead governments to commit excessive 
spending or divert these revenues to their advantage for personal gain or political 
patronage. Earlier, Lane and Tornell (1996) explained these deficits by the fact that 
politicians redistribute rents to pressure groups and in proportion to income growth. 
This often takes place at the highest levels of government, distorting contracts that 
are signed with extractive industry companies and the terms of agreement for 
revenues to be paid (Ross, 2011). It also occurs when royalties and other payments 
are agreed and disbursed unofficially, leading to deployment into personal accounts 
rather than the state’s treasury.  
The view in this paper is that, after controlling for some institutional and 
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economic variables, higher levels of natural resources can lead governments to be 
less transparent, and likely less fiscally disciplined, in developing countries. This 
can be the result of greater pressure from within the country, but mostly from 
powerful international companies in the natural resources industry. To capture 
natural wealth, Total Natural Resources Rents as a share of GDP are used. These 
are obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2012). They represent 
the sum total of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, 
and forest rents.  
3.1.2. Quality of the Institutions and Fiscal Transparency 
Institutions are the stage where political actors, voters, and markets interact. The 
insight that institutions matter for government decisions and the outcome of these 
decisions is of profound importance to good governance, of which FT is a 
prominent part. Indeed, the first principle of the IMF Code of Good Practices on 
Fiscal Transparency, issued in 1998, named Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities, 
requires: “a clear legal and administrative framework for fiscal management”. This 
implies that fiscal transparency also involves good quality in the institutions. 
Institutions could affect the behaviour of the political actors, voters and markets, by 
creating uncertainty about the present and future behaviour of each other. Based on 
the case of developed countries, Andreula et al. (2009) demonstrated that good 
quality of institutions has a positive effect on fiscal transparency. 
 
 
 
All countries in the sample are ordered in terms of the indicator of regulatory 
quality and of the fiscal transparency index. Then, all the data were sorted 
according to the indicator of regulatory quality.  
In this paper we take this view that fiscal transparency requires an improvement 
in the quality of institutions, especially in the case of developing countries. For the 
data on the quality of the institutions, we use the governance indicators developed 
by Kaufmannet al. (2002). They combine both large opinion surveys and measures 
based on polls of experts to define six indices of governance. Among the six 
indicators, we consider Regulatory Quality (RQ), which indicates the government’s 
ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations. In addition, it 
has the highest coefficient of correlation with all the other institutional indicators. 
It is therefore suitable for the present study. The data are drawn from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, 2011). Figure 1 shows the association 
between the regulatory indicator and the index of fiscal transparency.  
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Figure 1. Quality of the Institution and Fiscal Transparency
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The main observation we can make from Figure 1 is that countries with lower 
regulatory quality also tend to have lower fiscal transparency. At the low end we 
have Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Tajikistan; Paraguay, whose indicators are all 
very low. Also, countries with higher index of RQ have relatively higher FT 
indices. Countries with weaker institutions are also less transparent; thereby 
confirms the above reasoning.  
3.1.3. Literacy and Fiscal Transparency 
Average literacy rate has been identified as a crucial measure of the value of a 
regions human capital. Also, several actors and organizations involved in the fight 
for more budget transparency like the International Budget Partnership (IBP) and 
The Global Movement for Budget Transparency, Accountability and 
Participation (BTAP) claim that civil society plays a role in budget transparency by 
means of pressuring the governments. v Such claims are also strengthened by 
scientific papers such like Bernardino and Bastida (2009) who conclude that the 
achievement of a high level of fiscal transparency requires the presence of an 
effective legislation which scrutinizes budget reports, discusses and influences 
budget policy; and an effective civil society, as represented by media and 
nongovernmental organizations, which must influence budget policy and hold 
government accountable.  
Moreover, the view taken here is that the fight of civil society for fiscal 
transparency is conditional upon the level of literacy of the population. For 
example, Harvey Graff (1991) finds that a low level of literacy of a population is 
associated with a level of community engagement and civic participation that is 
also low. This is because an individual who does not have a sufficient level of 
education cannot be a full member of society and cannot participate fully in social 
and political battles. A highly literate population may also have higher 
understanding of public budgets and strong social mobilization on economic and 
developmental issues needed to advocate changes in how resources are allocated 
and used towards the reduction of economic injustice. The level of education of a 
population is often considered as a control variable in the analysis of fiscal 
transparency. vi For the present study, we use the literacy rate of adults, as the 
variable of interest. It is the percentage of people aged 15 and above who can read 
and write simple texts. The data are drawn from World Development Indicators 
(2011).  
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Note: All countries in the sample are ordered in terms of the indicator of the literacy rate 
and of the index of fiscal transparency. Then, all the data were sorted according to the 
literacy rate.   
 
Figure 2 depicts the relationship between the literacy rate of the population and 
the index of fiscal transparency, in terms of the ranking of the countries of the 
sample. According to Figure 2, there is a weak positive link between the rankings 
of countries based on both the literacy rate and the index of fiscal transparency, 
which weakly confirm our a-priori reasoning. Some countries with higher literacy 
rates also have higher indices of fiscal transparency. This is the case for Ukraine, 
Moldova, Macedonia or Bulgaria. At the low end there are also countries like 
Cameroon, Mozambique or El Salvador, with lower literacy rate that also display 
low indices of fiscal transparency. The empirical analysis presented below provides 
a clearer idea of the nature of that relation. 
3.1.4. Openness and Fiscal Transparency 
This section turns to the relationship between openness to trade and capital 
movements and fiscal transparency. These links have not yet received attention in 
the literature. It has been shown that capital mobility and trade openness enhance 
fiscal effectiveness, in terms of budget-deficit reduction. Countries which have 
implemented openness policies are better able to face external shocks brought by 
that openness. That is, they have higher resilience in terms of disciplined budgets. 
In their study of the impact of trade openness on budget balance, Combes and 
Saadi-Sedik (2006) make a distinction between natural openness (exports plus 
imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP) and trade-policy-induced 
openness which corresponds to the removal of barriers against international trade. 
Natural openness is determined by the fitted value derived from a regression of 
actual trade openness on some structural variables, and the residuals. Countries that 
are not naturally open are more corrupt because of available rents; while openness, 
as a policy, leads to less corruption, to potentially sounder budget systems and to 
more efficient fiscal administrations.  
This attempts to connect a country’s openness to its performance in terms of 
fiscal transparency. Openness to international trade and capital movements helps 
foster fiscal transparency because it reduces the costs and increase the benefits of 
fiscal transparency since trade openness leads to increased competition and 
economic growth, while international capitals encourage efficient economic 
environments.Both economic aspects of openness are considered here: trade and 
capital account openness.  
For trade openness, we use the sum of exports and imports of all goods and 
market services as a share of GDP. The data used are provided by World 
Development Indicators (2012). For capital account openness, the Chinn-Ito 
(2008)index, KAOPEN, is used. This is based on binary dummy variables that 
codify the restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF's 
AREAER.vii Other indicators of capital account openness exist in the literature. For 
instance, Quinn (1997, 2003) has compiled a composite index based upon his 
coding of qualitative information from texts in the various issues of AREAER, 
taking into consideration whether the country has entered into agreements with 
international organizations such as the OECD and the European Union. Despite the 
merits of the Quinn index, at the time of writing this paper, this dataset is not 
publicly available. While containing overtime variation and focusing on the 
intensity of capital controls, KAOPEN has the widest coverage of countries and 
time periods among indices measuring financial openness.  
Figure 3 compares countries based on each of the indicators of openness and the 
corresponding index of fiscal transparency.  
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The relationship between trade openness and fiscal transparency does not 
provide a strong support to our a-priori reasoning. Trade openness does not seem to 
be linked with the index of fiscal transparency. One reason is that the natural 
resources, as defined above, often constitute the biggest share of the exports of 
many developing countries. Therefore, the level of trade does not appear to affect 
the effort to promote fiscal transparency, since the management (operation and 
exportation) of natural resources remains a private affair between the political 
authorities and the companies approved. That is the reason why countries like 
Equatorial Guinea, Jordan and Tajikistan have higher levels of trade openness 
while their indices of fiscal transparency are lower compared to the rest of the 
sample. However capital openness seems to be negatively associated with the index 
of fiscal transparency, in opposition with our expectations. Some countries, which 
are relatively less open in terms of capital mobility like Ukraine, Thailand, Gabon, 
Namibia, Moldova, have higher indices of fiscal transparency, while others like 
Jordan, El Salvador, or Kyrgyzstan have higher indices of capital account openness 
associated with lower indices of fiscal transparency. Once again, even though these 
graphs do not provide support to our predictions, we rely on the reasoning to keep 
openness to trade and openness to capital in the specification of our model.  
 
Figure 3.Openness and Fiscal Transparency 
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Note: All countries in the sample are ordered in terms of the indicator of the value of imports plus 
exports as share of GDP and of the KAOPEN index. These ordering are then compared to that in 
terms of the index fiscal transparency. In the graph on the left hand side all the orderings of openness 
and of FT index were sorted according to the trade openness value, and on that on the right hand side, 
the orderings of KAOPEN and of FT index are sorted according to KAOPEN 
 
3.2.  Control Variables 
Following the literature, we control for several socio-economic variables such 
as the unemployment rate, the Business Disclosure Index, GDP per capita, armed 
forces, and the number of updates of the ROSC. Indeed, unemployment can be 
taken as a potential indicator of government policy. It indicates whether the 
government is using its authority to ensure jobs through fiscal expansion or by 
changing regulations to promote small business. Unemployment negatively 
impacts the government's ability to generate income and also tends to reduce 
economic activity. When unemployment is high, fewer people are paying taxes to 
the government. At the same time, unemployment means there are fewer people 
with disposable income to spend on goods and services, which dampen economic 
growth. This could lead to lower incentive for the government to disclose fiscal 
information. Either because of the lower political importance of fiscal policy or 
because of the low financial gains as government revenue is low.  
For the business disclosure index, it measures the extent to which private actors 
are protected through disclosure of their ownership and financial information. This 
variable is used as a proxy of transparency of private sector. We believe in this 
paper that transparency in public activities should go along with the transparency in 
the private sector, at least in order to ensure significant detailed information about 
the procurements and resulting contracts issued by government bodies. In other 
words, if every private company is subject to the application of transparency, as 
least when the compagny is carrying out government contracts such as proposed by 
Di Ianni (2011), this may lead to the improvement of the overall government 
transparency. 
Armed forces variable is the number of military personnel, including 
paramilitary forces out of the population of the country. It is used here as a measure 
of the power that the political regime has at the expense of freedom of expression. 
So, we believe that important armed forces can be associated with less transparent 
government’s policies for at least two reasons: First, the important is the armed 
forces, the higher might be the oppression of the protected government over the 
population, preventing the civil society from holding the government accountable 
for the outcomes of its policy. Second, important armed forces might be associated 
with too high and opaque government spending on military equipment.  
The GDP per capita is used to control for relative differences in the levels of 
development in the sample. Several studies such as Jarmuzek et al. (2009) or 
Andreula et al. (2009) have found that developed countries display higher indices 
of fiscal transparency compared to developing ones.  As summarized by Khagram 
et al (2012), few empirical studies have found the level of development (per capita 
income) to be strongly related to various measures of transparency.viii In fact, the 
improvement of education as well as the expansion of middle classes may give rise 
to higher pressures for transparency, as better-off citizens come to desire greater 
quality and efficiency in the provision of public goods and gain the resources to 
express that interest politically, as supported by Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) and 
in IBP report (2013). 
The ROSC update is the number of times that the performance of a country has 
been assessed by IMF Officers. As we mentioned earlier, a few countries in the 
sample, including Mozambique, Bulgaria, Cameroon, El Salvador, Indonesia, 
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Kyrgyztan and Ukraine, have updated their ROSCs at least once. But the updated 
ROSCs are very short summaries that cannot be used to rate these countries again. 
However, we use the number of updates as an indicator of the engagement of the 
country toward promotion of fiscal transparency, following Hameed (2005). We 
expect it to positively affect fiscal transparency.  
All the data are drawn from world Development indicator (2012) except the 
ROSC updates which are available on the IMF website.  
3.3.  Empirical Model 
The empirical analysis aims to analyse the determinants of fiscal transparency. 
The objective is to examine the effects of natural resources, quality of institutions, 
literacy rate and openness to trade and capital movements on fiscal transparency. 
Following Alt and Lassen (2006), and Andreula et al. (2009), the empirical model 
could be presented as follow: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 𝑓𝑓 (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ, 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑄𝑄,𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑄𝑄,𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) (1)                             
where FT, the fiscal transparency index is a function of Natural Wealth, Quality 
of the Institutions, literacy rate and Openness -which is the vector of two measures 
of a country’s openness: capital account openness (KAOPEN) and trade openness 
(Trade).  
The regression model is therefore specified as follows: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(2) 
 Where Ziis the vector of socio-economic control variables.Equation 2 will be 
evaluated by means of parametric correlation analysis. Because our index of fiscal 
transparency does not have time variation, we cannot apply panel data analysis. 
Our empirical model is tested by the mean of cross-sectional analysis. Multivariate 
analyses such as ordinary least squares regressions will be applied to test the 
relationship between the selected variables and transparency.  
Besides this constraint, another important theoretical issue is that of the 
potential endogeniety nature of fiscal transparency, considered as an institutional 
variable and most of the explanatory variables. It means that the explanatory 
variables, on the right-hand-side of the equation (2), which are seen as 
determinants can also be outcomes of fiscal transparency (the dependant variable 
on the left-hand-side). In fact, the idea of equation (2) is that socio-economic 
conditions can influence public governance but at the same time public governance 
drives economic conditions. In the above specification the key variables retained as 
affecting fiscal transparency are Natural wealth, Quality of institutions, literacy rate 
and country’s openness. However, one can imagine a situation in which this also 
works in the opposite way. For example, fiscal transparency may provide 
framework for a country to implement an efficient exploitation of its natural 
resources.  
In the institutional literature, the primary strategy for dealing with endogeniety 
problem is to use instrumental variables to ensure that the estimators are consistent. 
One of the easier ways to do this is the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. 
This method is a special case of the generalized instrumental variable estimation. 
The procedure should commence from an estimation of the reduced form (equation 
(2)) by OLS.  
Given that, in the first step of the 2SLS method, our explanatory variables of 
interest that are likely endogenous are regressed on their determinants or 
instrumental variables. The crucial condition for choosing instrumental variables is 
that they have to be correlated with the endogenous variables, but not with the error 
term of the underlying model. ix We regressed natural resources on national income; 
Regulatory Quality on Human Development Index (HDI); literacy rate on HDI and 
population density; trade on national income and growth rate of the population; 
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capital account openness on national income and inflow of foreign aid. In the 
second step, we estimated the original equations, but each endogenous variable of 
interest located on the right hand side is replaced with its predicted values from the 
reduced form (regression on instrumental variables). However, rather than taking 
all the endogenous variables in a unique model, we specified five different models 
where only one of the above explanatory variables of interest is included, and the 
index of fiscal transparency remains the dependant variable. This allows us to 
avoid any multicollinearity problems, because some of the endogenous variables 
have the same instrument, as discussed above. That led to five estimations with 
OLS. In some cases we used different control variables in order to get the best fit 
of the models. We ended up with five estimations using two-stages least squared.  
Since the theoretical and empirical work on the issue of fiscal transparency is 
still in its nascent phase, a thorough technical analysis of the determinants of fiscal 
transparency is constrained by the factors that we mentioned above. Indeed, the 
absence of time variation in the data and potential existence of endogeniety make it 
difficult to claim causality between performance variables listed above and fiscal 
transparency. But it is still useful to show correspondence between them. 
 
4. Results 
Results of the general model of the determinants of fiscal transparency are 
presented in Table 6. In addition to using the aggregate fiscal transparency index 
FT, each of the four sub-indices is used as the dependant variable. The objective is 
to analyse the channel through which the retained potential factors determine fiscal 
transparency. 
 
Table 6:Determinants of Fiscal Transparency 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FT BS BO BP EBA 
Natrce -0.002 (0.25) 
-0.015 
(0.75) 
-0.018 
(0.9) 
-0.029* 0.042** 
(2.07) (3.00) 
KAOPEN -0.0462* -0.0229 -0.0919** -0.0415* -0.035 (1.92) (0.51) (2.62) (1.73) (0.95) 
Trade -0.016 -0.012 -0.002 -0.02 -0.027 (1.6) (0.86) (0.1) (1.43) (1.50) 
RQ 0.100* 0.0762 0.114 0.1035 0.1038 (2.05) (0.76) (0.91) (1.45) (1.33) 
Literacy 0.005** 0.0064 0.0038 0.0048 0.0048 (2.27) (1.6) (1.27) (1.60) (1.33) 
Busdisclo 0.076 0.039 0.003 0.092 0.166 (0.95) (0.26) (0.018) (1.02) (1.11) 
Armforce -0.0236* (2.14) 
-0.0318* 
(2.12) 
-0.042* 
(1.99) --------- 
-0.0023 
(0.10) 
Roscupd -0.0327 (1.56) -------- --------- 
-0.0519** 
(2.26) ---------- 
***, **, * denote significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, respectively.  Numbers in 
bracket are t-statistics calculated with robust standard errors. 
 
The results show that, taken together, some of the retained factors have 
significant coefficients. The coefficients of natural resources and openness to trade 
are not statistically significant, while the coefficient associated with capital account 
openness is statistically significant. The relationship between both variables of 
 JEPE, 2(1), M. F. Sharaf & Y. M. Tehou, p.69-91. 
85 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
openness and the index of fiscal transparency seems to be negative, which is 
different from our expectations, but the sign of the coefficient of KAOPEN 
confirms the trend in figure 3. The coefficients associated with natural resources, 
regulatory quality and literacy rate have the expected signs. 
Before applying the 2SLS method, a Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test for 
endogeneitywas performed as recommended by Davidsonand MacKinnon (1993). x 
Even though the test did not reveal that all the coefficients of the OLS models were 
inconsistent, the intuition presented above is the reason for conducting another set 
of model estimations using the 2SLS method whose result are presented in table 
7.xi 
 
Table 7: TwoStageLeastSquaresModels of theDeterminants of FiscalTransparency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables FT BS BO BP EBA 
Natrce -0.04** -0.046* -0.054 -0.027 -0.010*** 
 
(2.01) (1.820) (1.085) (0.174) (3.013) 
RQ 0.088* 0.085 0.022 0.151** 0.013 
 
(1.91) (0.952) (0.097) (2.072) (0.545) 
Literacy 0.04* 0.006** 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(1.78) (2.210) (0.710) (0.930) (0.760) 
KAOPEN -0.504*** -0.475** -1.220*** 0.142 -0.527** 
 
(3.93) (2.030) (2.422) (0.327) (0.198) 
Trade 0.011*** 0.008** 0.020*** -0.002 0.009** 
  (1.83) (2.030) (2.403) (0.637) (2.013) 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Column (1) includes the models 
where FT is the dependent variable. Columns (2) to column (5) include the models where the 
dependent variables are respectively BS, BO, BP, and EBA. Each predicted variable of interest was 
used in a specific 2SLS model. Therefore, in this table each coefficient represents a model. In 
addition to the above explanatory variables, these models include Unemployment rate, Business 
disclosure rate, Arm force, number of Rosc updates as additional control variables. 
 
The sign of the coefficient associated with natural resources is still negative as 
expected, meaning that the relationship between the natural wealth and fiscal 
transparency is negative. In other words, under certain conditions natural resources 
can be a limit to improving fiscal transparency practices. In order to achieve high 
levels of transparency in developing countries, efforts should be made on the 
transparency of using natural resource, other things being equal. So any Fiscal 
Transparency program should go along with programs such as Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), also initiated by the International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank Group. The sign of the coefficient of RQ is positive as expected; 
meaning that good quality of the institutions is associated with high levels of fiscal 
transparency, other things being equal. This result is in line with the findings of 
Andreula et al. (2009), who showed that there is a causal positive relationship 
between quality of the institutions and fiscal transparency, in the case of developed 
countries.  
Results also show a negative relationship between the capital account openness 
and fiscal transparency. The association is stronger in the 2SLS models (Table 
7).Capital inflows seems to be intended for exploitation of natural resources, which 
is based on generally subjective and less transparent contracts; while outflows leak 
to secret accounts in developed countries or intended for financing military 
equipment. The 2SLS estimation shows a positive and significant relation between 
openness to international trade and fiscal transparency, while the OLS estimation 
displayed a negative relation, which makes the relationship ambiguous.  
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Table 8: Determinants of Fiscal Transparency: Robustness Check using other 
Indices 
Variables            FT 
Andrula et al. 
(2009)        OBI 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Natrce 
-0.002 -0.04** -0.025** -0.065* -0.025** -0.08 
25) (2.01) 3.03) (2.37) (3.03) (1.02) 
KAOPEN 
-0.462 -5.04*** -0.518* 0.703** -0.518* 2.712** 
(1.92) (3.93) (2.36) (3.12) (2.36) (3.94) 
Trade 
-0.016 0.011* 0.001 -0.01** 0.001 -0.036** 
(1.60) (1.83) (0.12) (3.12) -0.12 (3.94) 
RQ 
1.00* 0.088* 0.765 0.755** 0.765 2.913** 
(2.04) (1.91) (1.51) (3.12) (1.51) (3.94) 
Literacy 
0.05** 0.04* 0.039* 0.038* 0.039* 0.077* 
(2.27) (1.78) (2.17) (2.26) (2.17) (2.45) 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Column (1) and (2) include the 
models where FT is the dependent variable. Columns (3) to Column (6) include the models where the 
dependent variables are the index constructed by Andrula et al. (2009) and a 3-years average of the 
IBP index. Each variable was used in a specific 2SLS model. Therefore, in this table each coefficient 
represents to a model. In addition to the above explanatory variables these models include 
Unemployment rate, Busdisclosure rate, Arm force, number of Rosc updates as controls (The sources 
for each variable are discussed in the text.) 
 
Literacy rate has a positively and statistically significant relationship with fiscal 
transparency. This means that countries with high literacy rates also have good 
levels of fiscal transparency, other things being equal. High literacy rate of the 
population leads to strong communities, civil society and groups of pressure that 
demand access to information and participation in decision-making. The 
introduction of the number of updates of the ROSCs leads to poorer results 
everywhere. It means that the number of assessment of the country’s practice of 
fiscal transparency is not an indicator of its performance. In other words, it shows 
that we should not consider the number of ROSCs published, as Glennerster and 
Shin (2003) did earlier, as an indicator of the level of fiscal transparency.  
For the robustness checks, we used other indices to estimate the same models 
specified above.xii In this regard, we use the fiscal transparency index constructed 
by Andreula et al. (2009) as well as the average of the Open Budget Index.xiii We 
could not consider other indices that exist in the literature because the numbers of 
countries that we have in common is too small. In order to obtain comparable 
coefficients, we adjusted the range of all the retained indices to be from 0 to 10.  
As depicted in Table 8, results of the robustness check show that our findings 
are consistent with what the other indices predict. Definitely, with a few exceptions 
mostly regarding the sizes and the significance of the parameters, the directions of 
the relationship tend to be similar. For example, the variable of natural resources is 
still negatively associated with all the indices of fiscal transparency. The 
coefficient is larger when we use the Andreula et al. (2009) index. The relationship 
between capital account openness, trade and OBI are ambiguous, as the signs 
change from the OLS to the 2SLS models. The same thing holds with the Andreula 
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et al. (2009) index in the case of capital account openness. For the rest, all the signs 
are consistent with our results. The significance of the relationship between quality 
of institutions, trade, and the level of fiscal transparency is stronger with both these 
indices, while the significance of the relationship between fiscal transparency and 
the literacy rate of the population is weaker than what the model predicts with our 
index. 
 
5. Conclusion  
The objective of this paper was to propose an answer to the question raised in 
several earlier studies about what factors determine fiscal transparency in 
developing countries. We contribute to the existing literature by analyzing some 
economic factors, including natural wealth and openness, and non-economic 
factors, such as the quality of institutions and literacy level of the populations, in 
their relation with fiscal transparency. 
In this paper, we used the reports of adherence to the Code of Good Practices on 
Fiscal Transparency to construct a new and replicable index of fiscal transparency, 
inspired by Hameed (2005),Jarmuzek et al (2009) and Andreula et al. (2009). The 
index is used to investigate the relationship between the above factors and fiscal 
transparency. Initially the OLS was applied, but because of the potential 
endogeneity nature of fiscal transparency, we also applied the Two-Stage Least 
Squares method to ensure that the estimators are consistent. That led to some 
changes in the magnitude and the statistical significance of the variables, but to 
very few changes in the sign of the coefficients. Results of the multivariate 
analyses reveal that the level of natural resources and openness of the capital 
account are negatively associated with fiscal transparency. Also, good quality of 
institutions tends to go along with good practices of fiscal transparency, even after 
controlling for important socio-economical factors. In addition, results also show 
that the level of literacy of a population is positively associated with the country’s 
level of fiscal transparency, confirming the prediction of some international 
organizations that call for budget transparency, according to which higher literacy 
rate of the population is a conditional criteria for having a strong civil society, 
which can play a role for budget transparency. However, the paper does not 
provide evidence of a relationship between openness to international trade and 
fiscal transparency, as the sign changes from the OLS to the 2SLS estimations.  
As a robustness check, we used the index proposed by Andreula et al. (2009) 
and the Open Budget Index, two commonly used indices in the literature, that share 
a significant sample of countries with our index. We simply replace our index with 
these indices in the estimation of the same models of our specification, applying 
both the OLS and the 2SLS methods. Apart from slight differences in the sizes of 
the coefficients, the significance and the signs of the relationships are almost the 
same as what was predicted using our index.  
One limitation of the current study is its cross sectional nature which stems 
from the lack of a time-series dimension for the fiscal transparency index. The 
replication of our index is possible if the countries are reassessed every four years 
as planned by the IMF and the World Bank, and if the updated ROSCs are written 
and structured like their first versions. Also, an important direction for future 
research would be to examine the outcomes of fiscal transparency practice for 
developing countries. Examples include its impact on education, health or 
economic growth. The findings of this paper provide an explanation of why, after a 
decade of fiscal transparency programs, many developing countries are still lagging 
behind, thereby losing the potential benefits mentioned in the literature. These 
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findings could help guide policies directed at improving fiscal transparency 
practices in the case of developing countries. 
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Endnotes 
iPrecisely, after the Mexican economic crisis (of 1994/1995) and the Asian financial crises 
(of 1997), many international organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the 
OECD identified fiscal transparency as a key aspect of good governance. Accordingly, 
they initiated several programs including the Code of Good Practices on Fiscal 
Transparency - Declaration on Principles in 1998 (revised in 2007), followed in 2001 by 
the OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency, andbythe multi-stakeholder 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), launched in 2002, to address 
resource revenue transparency issues in resource-rich countries. Furthermore, the IMF 
and the World Bank have jointly prepared the "Reports of the Observance of Standards 
and Codes" (ROSCs). 
iiAccording to the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook Report, April 
2012. 
iiiWe did not consider ROSCs that were not structured that this way, even though it was 
published in or after 2004. 
ivThanks to FarhanHameed who kindly sent us his data. 
v See the Dar Es Salaam Declaration on Budget Transparency, Accountability, and 
Participation (November 18, 2011). 
viSee Alt et al. (2002 and 2006) or Bernardino and Bastida (2009). 
vii In 1997, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER) started publishing the data on disaggregated components of capital controls, 
with the specification of thirteen categories including, for the first time, a distinction 
between restrictions on inflows and outflows as well as between different types of capital 
transactions. 
viiiSee sanjeevkhagram, paolo de renzio, and archon fung (2012). 
ixHowever, the validity of instrumental variables can be tested if and only if the system is 
over-identified, which means a situation in which the number of endogenous variables is 
less than the total number of variables excluded from the equation under consideration. 
Otherwise the only feasible option is to rely on economic theory or intuition (Verbeek, 
2004). 
xDavidson and MacKinnon (1993) suggest an augmented regression test (the Durbin–Wu–
Hausman test), which can easily be formed by including the residuals of each endogenous 
right-hand side variable, as a function of all exogenous variables, in a regression of the 
original model. 
xiThe results are not presented, but in general the inconsistency was observed in two of the 
five models, that is the coefficients associated with residuals of RQ and Natrce were 
significantly different from zero, which should assume that previous OLS estimation 
including these variable is not consistent. 
xiiThe use of other indices in the same specification of the model allows for testing the 
consistency of our result, given that these selected indices are not perfectly correlated 
with our constructed index. 
xiiiInternational Budget Partnership provides indices of budget transparency, called Open 
Budget Index (OBI) every two years. But two things prevent us from running a panel data 
analysis for robustness check: the lack of data concerning some countries of our sample, 
and the fact that a panel data analysis cannot be used as a robustness check of the initial 
cross-sectional analysis. 
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